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23 noiembrie 2009

Presupunerile - mama tuturor esecurilor

"In economics, [...] it is generaly accepted that the validity of a theory depends on the empirical accuracy of its predictions rather than on the realism of its assumtion." Friedman

Reformulata "artistic", reprodusa in traducere academica, aceasta afirmatie am gasit-o intr-un serial politist: "Presupunerea este mama tuturor esecurilor"

Cata dreptate, si nu stiu cum sa fac sa demonstrez asta si "specialistilor in micro si macro" de pe plaiurile noastre.

Poate aveti vreo sugestie?

18 august 2009

logica dinamica a contradictoriului - un mod creativ de abordare a crizei?

Putin cunoscut in Romania, Stefan Lupascu (sau in varianta internationala mai mult cunoscuta - Stéphane Lupasco) el este autorul uneia dintre cele mai interesante teorii despre logica dinamica a contradictoriului. Bazata pe observatii din lumea fizicii, teoria enuntata in cuvinte conform lucrarii lui "Principiul antagonismului si logica energiei" suna asa:
"Oricarui fenomen, sau eveniment logic, ca si judecatii care il gandeste, propozitiei care il exprima sau semnului care il simbolizeaza: lui e de exemplu, trebuie sa-i fie asociat intotdeauna structural si functional, un antifenomen, sau antielement, sau antieveniment logic si deci o judecata, o propozitie, un semn contradictoriu: non-e; si intr-un asemenea mod, incat e sau non-e nu vor putea fi niciodata mai mult decat potentializate prin actualizarea lui e sau non-e, nu facute sa dispara, astfel ca e sau non-e sa-si fie suficiente lor insile intr-o interdependenta si deci o noncontradictie riguroasa - ca in orice logica, clasica sau de alta natura, care se intemeiaza pe atotputernicia principiului noncontradictiei. Acest postulat, p ecare l-am exprimat, de bine, de rau, prin cuvinte si fraze si care nu poate fi definit corespunzator decat prin formule simbolice, contine proprietatea lui e si non-e de a se actualiza si potentializa alternativ si intr-un asemenea mod, incat actualizarea unuia determina intotdeauna si obligatoriu potentializarea celuilalt."

Formulele asupra carora nu insist aici, ajung la urmatoarea concluzie: "daca e este actual (sau se actualizeaza), atunci non-e este potential (sau se potentializeaza); daca e nu este nici actual nici potential, atunci non-e nu este nici potential nici actual si daca non-e este potential atunci e este actual (sau se actualizeaza)."

Acest mod logic de a percepe o realitate inconjuratoare transpus in zona de management al riscurilor ar putea conduce la o noua (r)evolutie? Nu am cunostinta ca impactul logicii polivalente (in cazul de fata vorbim de cea dinamica a contradictoriului a lui Lupascu) sa fi fost studiat, empiric macar, in ceea ce priveste relevanta in domeniul managementului riscurilor. Cert este ca modul de indentificare al riscurilor, tributar pana acum principiului logicii bivalente, "tertium non datur" ar putea rasturna inclusiv modul in care riscurile sunt identificate si calculate. Spre exemplu in zona fizicii cuantice
Hans Reichenbach a identificat pornind de la relatiile de indeterminare ale lui Heisenberg, o logica cu trei valori: adevar verificat, fals verificat si imposibil de determinat.

22 aprilie 2009

temelia noului management

A pus Nassim in Financial Times un decalog al bunului simt pentru managementul riscului (d)intotdeauna. Si culmea, cele propuse nu se refera numai la managementul riscului, daca vreti este si un decalog al iesirii din criza. Sunt tare curios daca cineva va subscrie acestei liste de principii:

"1. What is fragile should break early while it is still small. Nothing should ever become too big to fail. Evolution in economic life helps those with the maximum amount of hidden risks – and hence the most fragile – become the biggest.
 
2. No socialisation of losses and privatisation of gains. Whatever may need to be bailed out should be nationalised; whatever does not need a bail-out should be free, small an riskbearing. We have managed to combine the worst of capitalism and socialism. In France in the 1980s, the socialists took over the banks. In the US in the 2000s, the banks took over the government. This is surreal.

3. People who were driving a school bus blindfolded (and crashed it) should never be given a new bus. The economics establishment (universities, regulators, central bankers, government officials, various organisations staffed with economists) lost its legitimacy with the failure of the system. It is irresponsible and foolish to put our trust in the ability of such experts to get us out of this mess. Instead, find the smart people whose hands are clean.

4. Do not let someone making an “incentive” bonus manage a nuclear plant – or your financial risks. Odds are he would cut every corner on safety to show “profits” while claiming to be “conservative”. Bonuses do not accommodate the hidden risks of blow-ups. It is the asymmetry of the bonus system that got us here. No incentives without disincentives: capitalism is about rewards and punishments, not just rewards.

5. Counter-balance complexity with simplicity. Complexity from globalisation and highly
networked economic life needs to be countered by simplicity in financial products. The complex economy is already a form of leverage: the leverage of efficiency. Such systems survive thanks to slack and redundancy; adding debt produces wild and dangerous gyrations and leaves no room for error. Capitalism cannot avoid fads and bubbles: equity bubbles (as in 2000) have proved to be mild; debt bubbles are vicious.

6. Do not give children sticks of dynamite, even if they come with a warning. Complex derivatives need to be banned because nobody understands them and few are rational enough to know it. Citizens must be protected from themselves, from bankers selling them “hedging” products, and from gullible regulators who listen to economic theorists.

7. Only Ponzi schemes should depend on confidence. Governments should never need to “restore confidence”. Cascading rumours are a product of complex systems. Governments cannot stop the rumours. Simply, we need to be in a position to shrug off rumours, be robust in the face of them.

8. Do not give an addict more drugs if he has withdrawal pains. Using leverage to cure the problems of too much leverage is not homeopathy, it is denial. The debt crisis is not a temporary problem, it is a structural one. We need rehab.

9. Citizens should not depend on financial assets or fallible “expert” advice for their retirement. Economic life should be definancialised. We should learn not to use markets as storehouses of value: they do not harbour the certainties that normal citizens require. Citizens should experience anxiety about their own businesses (which they control), not their investments (which they do not control).

10. Make an omelette with the broken eggs. Finally, this crisis cannot be fixed with makeshift repairs, no more than a boat with a rotten hull can be fixed with ad-hoc patches. We need to rebuild the hull with new (stronger) materials; we will have to remake the system before it does so itself. Let us move voluntarily into Capitalism 2.0 by helping what needs to be broken break on its own, converting debt into equity, marginalising the economics and business school
establishments, shutting down the “Nobel” in economics, banning leveraged buyouts, putting bankers where they belong, clawing back the bonuses of those who got us here, and teaching people to navigate a world with fewer certainties.

Then we will see an economic life closer to our biological environment: smaller companies, richer ecology, no leverage. A world in which entrepreneurs, not bankers, take the risks and companies are born and die every day without making the news." 

DACA CINEVA DINTRE APROPIATII ACTUALULUI EXECUTIV CITESTE SI VREA SA TRANSMITA MAI DEPARTE ACEST TEXT, BUCUROS IL TRADUC SI IL EXPLIC!

8 martie 2009

next step: psihologia crizei sau criza psihologica?

un punct de vedere interesant asupra caracteristicilor actualei crize financiare vine din acest paper. Ceea ce mi se pare interesant este concluzia care spune ca sunt doua aspecte pentru care economistii actuali nu au fost deloc pregatiti (un truism, in fapt, economistii nu sunt niciodata pregatiti, dar explica foarte bine post factum de ce s-a intamplat):
1. "preceding boom had its origin – at least to a large part – in the development of new financial products that opened up new investment possibilities (while most previous crises were the consequence of overinvestment in new physical investment possibilities)."
2. "the global dimension of the current crisis is due to the increased connectivity of our already highly interconnected financial system."

in cazul 1, sunt nenumarate semnale de avertizare timpurie lansate de milionari rezultati de pe urma utilizari instrumentelor mentionate (vezi Soros Criza Globala a Capitalismului care, atentie, a  fost publicata in 1998!!!!), pe urma toate recomandarile G30 si ale altor comitete si comisii. Cine le-a citit? eu da, ma indoiesc ca mare parte din cei care au fixat obiective strategice in aceasta zona le-au luat vreodata in serios. de altfel si acum, recent, participand la o conferinta de management al riscului am avut surpriza sa ma izbesc de cerbicia destoinica a unor traderi de banca comerciala care propuneau hedgingul pe cursul valutar ca o solutie, in conditiile in care acest hedging nu avea loc pe o piata reglementata si nici nu se desfasura printr-o casa de compensatie. Mottoul scris pe fruntea lor era probabil noi suntem mai presus de risc, dealtfel persoanele in cauza reprezentatu una din bancile care  au generat atacul asupra leului de la sfarsitul lui 2008. rezultatul acestui cinism vino sa te asiguri impotriva riscului produs de cursul valutar, pentru ca daca nu o faci vom avea noi grija sa te afecteze, nu s-a finalizat decat cu o demisie. Deocamdata!

In privinta interconectivitatii, un lucru senzational, in ceea ce priveste Romania este faptul ca atunci cand ultima criza mondiala care a afectat Europa, isi arata coltii pe piata Ruseasca, pietele noastre de capital, perfect necorelate inregistrau cresteri fara precedent. Situatia s-a repetat si la inceputul acestui mileniu, cand randamentele spectaculoase obtinute la BVB si pe Rasdaq de data asta ca investitor in portofoliul de actiuni, din nou nu au tinut seama de ce se intampla pe pietele dezvoltate. Exita atunci o singura implicatie, cu cat mai mari erau scaderile pe piata de actiuni, cu atat mai mari erau volumele tranzactionate pe pietele de marfuri, pentru hedging. dar aceasta particularitate a conectivitatii pe toate nivelurile, scoate la iveala acum in aceasta criza faptul ca pietele activelor de baza sunt practic corelate cu pietele derivatelor pe aceste active. Aceasta observatie empirica nu o pot sustine cu argumente, deocamdata, dar nu vi se pare curioasa o criza in care spre exemplul pretul titeiului scade constant? 

Bottom line, am fost avertizati ca aceste lucruri vor fi posibil sa se intample, dar despre cum se vor intampla, intradevar, cred ca nimeni a fost si nu va fi in stare sa prognozeze. Aspectul nerational, psihologic al acestor reactii ale pietelor, va conduce probabil economia ca disciplina catre un next level. care va fi acesta, greu de  spus deocamdata, dar cu siguranta, psihologia va juca un rol, poate chiar mai important dcat a jucat matematica pana in prezent. 

Voi ce credeti?

3 martie 2009

stimulentul spagii: o asigurare?

economia spagii a inceput sa fie studiata si cateva cercetari si concluzii au fost trase pana acum la un mod mai mult sau mai putin empiric. daca mutam insa analiza acestui act in perspectiva a ceea ce il stimuleaza pe un individ sa dea spaga, lucrurile devin mult mai interesante si mai nuantabile.
Caz concret: reputata firma de asigurari vinde pachete de astfel asigurari pentru ATENTIE: "doar pentru a asigura evenimente neprevazute, nu cele sigure. Cu alte cuvinte, orice cost legat de
aceasta afectiune preexistenta nu va fi acoperit de asigurare." 
In aceste conditii, pornind de la realitatea conform careia Bribery is a health problem in Romania lucru cu care dealtfel nu s-a confruntat numai cine nu a ajuns prin spitale, stau si ma intreb, economic vorbind, care este reactia de asteptat din partea unui individ: sa plateasca o asigurare in mod frecvent (luna de luna, an de an) care s-ar putea cu un orizont de probabilitate destul de incert sa-l puna in situatia sa mai vina si cu bani de acasa pentru suferinta tratata sau sa se bazeze pe hazard (cand se va intampla voi plati spaga aferenta si cine stie poate nu se va intampla) ?

2 februarie 2009

My time will come: interest rate will raise and die...eventually

Few years ago I was taking a finance class, within a Risk management program in USA and I had one particular question for my teacher at that time: why do we still need interest rate? Since the moment of Bretton Woods when gold became a different "commodity" than money is it still wise to rely on something so conventional defined with such a "strict precision" as the value of one piece of paper?

My question raised interest in professor's mind and a fierce reaction especially  from my colleagues (most of them bankers in Eastern Europe at that time:). They jumped on me trying to explain everything that was told during their own studies back home: Money is a commodity and as a consequence it has a price. Therefore if you ask for money you have to pay for bla bla... Needless to say that even here the price is not the mathematical result of the demand and supply law. (those who don't think so, could give a try repeating the experiments of Dan Ariely that concluded sharp: price is mostly triggered by supply side).

In fact you don't pay the price of the commodity but the expectation of what this price would be. Based on that derivatives emerged hedging became a temptation and in the end as we all see, speculation won the battle. 

This question I had back in 2002, came back to my attention while reading another challenge raised by someone else here:

"What assumptions are we making that we do not know we're making?

And the root cause could be what? Allow me to posit that it is:

Double Entry Book Keeping."

and I would dare to bring another assumtion more: concept of interest rate or what it became out of it. Time will prove if the major change will start from basics or from ashes (VAR, and other nice maps as professor Kanheman says.

sunt bancherii sarlatani?

Daca nu vi se pare evident din modul in care arata scadentarele si din felul in care se interpun in lantul crearii de valoare prin instrumente distrugatoare de valoare, urmariti doua puncte de vedere absolut savuroase in intalnirea lui Daniel Kahneman si Nassim Taleb:

http://www.edge.org/documents/archive/edge273.html#dld

20 ianuarie 2009

cine-si permite sa fi "short" in perioade de criza?

Statul! Da, chiar asa.
Pentru ca el antameaza prin institutiile care il reprezinta cheltuirea unor bani in baza unor incasari pe crede ca le va primi in cursul anului de la cei care platesc taxe si impozite.
Atunci, cum ramane cu activele toxice?

16 octombrie 2008

why I don't want to be Nobel Awarded! :)

One day after the Nobel committee announced that Paul Krugman had won the 2008 Nobel Prize for economics, colleagues of Mr. Krugman voiced concerns that winning the coveted award could turn him into an egregious
douchebag.
At The New York Times, where Mr. Krugman is an op-ed page columnist, and at Princeton University, where he is a professor of economics, co-workers of the newly-minted Nobel laureate were reportedly bracing for the worst.
"I think it's safe to say that Paul had pretty high self-esteem before the Nobel thing went down," said one of Mr. Krugman's Princeton associates, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "But now he's walking around like he's Jay-Z or something." The first ominous sign, according to the associate, came at a meeting of the economics department this morning, when Mr. Krugman showed up with a coffee mug reading, "No. 1 Economist." While his colleagues discussed the current global financial crisis, Mr. Krugman "couldn't be bothered" and spent the meeting texting Matt Damon instead. At one point, one of his fellow economists asked him a question about credit default swaps, to which Mr. Krugman reportedly snapped, "Credit default swaps can suck my ass -- I'm Paul Fucking Krugman!"
Mr. Krugman could not be reached for comment and instead referred all questions to his publicist, Sherri Hefstein, whom he hired minutes after winning the Nobel.According to Ms. Hefstein, Mr. Krugman plans to spend the next few
months "building his brand" and will be adapting his book, International Economics: Theory and Policy, into a feature film to star George Clooney.

taken from borowitz report.

7 octombrie 2008

financial innovation: where is it when you need it?

Speaking about innovation: now is the time, in the financial turmoil we face, to dig for innovative solutions. where are the brains paid to deliver but to think to take advantage on this turn? 

One said that is nothing wrong with the smartest solution: make money when everybody does or make money when everybody don't. While facing the "change of the rules" all over the financial industries - would it be wise to help everybody just not to lose money? So, how this can be done without nationalizations?

23 septembrie 2008

the fourth quadrant - another perspective

There are just few days since the article of Nassim Taleb, THE FOURTH QUADRANT: A MAP OF THE LIMITS OF STATISTICS, was published on Edge.org. Plenty of replicas and reactions appeared all over the web. I just wonder if what he says has been perceived on the Europe banking environment as it is a true fact: you can’t predict, don’t fight (i.e. trade) with/against a number. 

I have learnt from the Romanian economy that numbers were always meant to be presented for official reports therefore it really didn’t matter how accurate they were. I would like to know how much would change this mentality the specific requirements based on Basel and SoX. Or what would be the next Basel? More restrictions and more supervisory regulations. 

One was saying once: what does a risk manager have to do for a living? And we are talking here about a very specific job, pretty well defined, that didn’t exist 20 years ago. Though we could say risks were always there no matter we were in Mediocristan or Extremistan. Nassim is making a point in saying “Alas, this category of blind users includes regulators and risk managers, whom I accuse of creating more risk than they reduce.” But as one CEO would say: more risk is more profit what should be than the working incentive for the risk manager? Should we worry about people that make a living out of numbers no one else would understand. If we don’t need them what would replace them?

On the other side I will not cover the red line of the article which I really enjoy but I will stick with my questions around some points I am not sure I fully agree.

He says “my new mission is to build methods to turn lack of information, lack of understanding, and lack of "knowledge" into decisions”. I am looking forward to see that. But common sense would tell me that this is just another extreme of what we face today. Or is it the new petabyte management era?

Is it going Nassim to change the way we look at risks?

As he emphasizes “I have nothing against economists: you should let them entertain each others with their theories and elegant mathematics, and help keep college students inside buildings. But beware: they can be plain wrong, yet frame things in a way to make you feel stupid arguing with them. So make sure you do not give any of them risk-management responsibilities.” 

So the final question: Economists, if we don’t need them what would replace them?

22 septembrie 2008

17 septembrie 2008

Superstitie si noroc!

Care este legatura dintre superstitie si noroc am intrebat-o azi la cursul de germana pe una dintre colegele mele din America. Desi nu a putut sa-mi raspunda exact care este motivatia care sta la baza raspunsului dat de ea, ea precizat ca ea nu este o persoana superstitioasa deoarece se simte norocoasa. Soarta, dupa cum a precizat mai tarziu chiar ea. 

Si totusi nu pot sa nu ma intreb care este legatura dintre noroc si superstitie. Suntem superstitiosi pentru ca nu avem noroc? sau pentru ca vrem sa fim norocosi? Care ar fi atunci deviation to the mean in cazul unei superstitii aplicate la o decizie de tranzactionare?

16 septembrie 2008

About motivating people...

Poate ca examenul final al unui CEO in momentul de fata ar trebui sa fie acela al unui echilibru in toate cele. Oricat de ciudat ar parea dar nu pot sa ma abtin sa nu ma intreb cum poti oare atinge perfectiunea intr-un mecanism economic oricare ar fi el, atat timp cat in propriul sau interior liderul organizatiei, «de facto» nu si a gasit linistea si de ce nu, un anume soi de armonie care sa-i permita intelegerea celor din jurul sau. Pana nu demult, comunistii aveau o teorie conform careia nu poate fi persona cu responasibilitati in conducere cineva care nu are stagiul militar satisfacut. Oricat de stupid ar fi acest demers initiatic, raportat la o societate complet desacralizata, dar deloc lipsita de mituri, cum a fost cea comunista, they got the point cum se zice. Poate ca standardele s-au schimbat, dar natura umana este aceeasi si nevoile ei s-au diversificat.

Cum poti prin urmare motiva oamenii daca nu le poti intelege nevoile si mai ales cum le poti intelege daca nu le ai?

Oare unde incepe toleranta si sfarseste leadershipul?

8 septembrie 2008

2009 - End of the risk management theory as we know it and beginning of the Black Swan era?

The real value of the services without any obvious value added to a process (e.g. administrative for most of the business and in this particular case risk management for most of the institutions involved in financial business) can be perceived just when delivery fails. This is the case now with the financial industry and one of its services: risk management.

Nothing could be more convincing for the public opinion that RISK MANAGEMENT is a NEED than this financial turmoil we are facing now. Regardless of how much the risk minds would conference about it and how challenging risk managers can be for the ´growth of their organizations the theory and the contemporary practice is by far outdated. As Nassim Taleb challenged the financial community with its Black Swan theory, nothing will be the same, and nothing could be taken for granted anymore. So, where to place the bet, if investment theory lacks of forecast certitudes?

The time has come to move onto a new era. I just got to know that Nassim is working on paper to answer to my question: After Black Swan what? Shall we count along the risk milestones of the Harvard Business Review, this month issue, another one with Black Swan era?

Risk Management Milestones according to HBR September: 

"1952: Mean variance (aka modern portfolio theory) - Harry Markowitz

Late 1950s, early 1960s: State preference theory - Kenneth Arrow, Gérard Debreu

1958: “Indifference theory” - Franco Modigliani, Merton Miller

1960s: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) - William Sharpe et al.

1973: Options-pricing model - Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, Robert C. Merton

1976: Arbitrage pricing theory - Stephen Ross

1977: Underinvestment problem - Stewart Myers, Clifford Smith, René M. Stulz

1979: Binomial option pricing model - John Cox, Stephen Ross, Mark Rubinstein

1993: A framework for risk management including hedging - Kenneth Froot, David Scharfstein, Jeremy Stein"